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ABSTRACT
Partitioning and distributing deep neural networks (DNNs) over
physical nodes such as edge, fog, or cloud nodes, could enhance
sensor fusion, and reduce bandwidth and inference latency. How-
ever, when a DNN is distributed over physical nodes, failure of
the physical nodes causes the failure of the DNN units that are
placed on these nodes. The performance of the inference task will
be unpredictable, and most likely, poor, if the distributed DNN
is not specifically designed and properly trained for failures. Mo-
tivated by this, we introduce deepFogGuard, a DNN architecture
augmentation scheme for making the distributed DNN inference
task failure-resilient. To articulate deepFogGuard, we introduce the
elements and a model for the resiliency of distributed DNN infer-
ence. Inspired by the concept of residual connections in DNNs,
we introduce skip hyperconnections in distributed DNNs, which
are the basis of deepFogGuard’s design to provide resiliency. Next,
our extensive experiments using two existing datasets for the sens-
ing and vision applications confirm the ability of deepFogGuard to
provide resiliency for distributed DNNs in edge-cloud networks.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) applications,
increasing numbers of smart IoT devices are being deployed and
integrated into our daily routines. Smart homes, smart cities, wear-
ables, self-driving vehicles, AR and VR, context sensing and crowd-
sensing, and smart retail are examples of adaptations of IoT devices
into human spaces [33, 34]. To intelligently analyze and act on the
data that IoT devices generate, machine learning (ML) techniques
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are seen to be promising. This is primarily because IoT devices
are often directly connected to data sources, such as cameras, mi-
crophones, gyroscopes, or sensors that capture a large quantity of
input data that could feed the ML models [2, 29].
Due to their accuracy and powerful expressiveness, deep learn-
ing methods, among other ML techniques, have been a successful
choice for IoT applications in a broad spectrum of domains such as
computer vision, speech recognition, medical diagnosis, and natu-
ral language processing [17, 21]. Deep learning techniques make
use of deep neural networks (DNNs). In certain DNN-empowered
IoT applications, the inference task runs for a prolonged period of
time. Examples of such IoT applications are image-based defect
detection in a factory, automatic recognition of parts during prod-
uct assembly, or anomaly behavior detection in a crowd based on
DNNs [6]. Nevertheless, a challenge with DNN-empowered IoT
applications is determining where the DNNmodel should be placed
for the inference task.
The immediate option may be deploying DNNs directly onto the
IoT devices; however, this is often infeasible, as many IoT devices
are resource-constrained and cannot efficiently support the compu-
tational requirements of DNNs. For instance, according to Liu et al.
[18], the GoogleNet model for image classification is larger than
20 MB and requires about 1.5 billion multiply-add operations per
inference per image.
Another possibility is to place the DNN in the cloud and send
the IoT data to the cloud, since the cloud servers are equipped with
powerful hardware such as TPUs and GPUs. Nevertheless, when
a DNN is deployed in the cloud, the data has to be continuously
transmitted from IoT devices to the cloud in WAN environments
during inference, which results in the heavy consumption of net-
work resources, high latency, and privacy concerns [18, 29].
Another option for DNN placement is to distribute the DNN
over physical nodes along an edge-fog-cloud hierarchy [9, 14, 18,
20, 28, 29]. The idea of thie current approach is to distribute the
DNN onto edge nodes, fog nodes, and cloud nodes so that inference
from IoT data is processed along the route, on different physical
nodes from the edge to cloud.
A natural question that arises with this approach is whether
the resulting distributed DNN inference along edge-fog-cloud is
resilient in the presence of physical nodes failures. Specifically, the
question is:what happens to an ongoing inference task of a distributed
DNN when its physical nodes fail, and how can we make distributed
DNN inference resilient to physical node failures? This question is
the topic of our study.
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When a DNN is distributed over physical nodes, failure of a
physical node causes the failure of the DNN units that are placed on
the node. Failure of physical nodes could be due to power outages,
cable cuts, natural disasters, or hardware/software failures. The
effect of such failures on distributed DNN inference may be heavily
dependent on the time to recover from the failures.
While the physical nodes are being recovered, the performance
of the distributed DNN inference is unpredictable, and most likely,
poor, if the distributed DNN is not specifically designed and prop-
erly trained for failure resiliency. This is especially important for
critical applications that cannot tolerate unpredictable and poor
performance, even for a short time.
In this article, we study the failure resiliency of distributed DNN
inference over the edge, fog, and cloud nodes, where the failure
of a physical node results in the failure of the DNN units that are
placed on the node. Our main contributions in this article are
(1) We introduce deepFogGuard, a DNN architecture augmenta-
tion scheme for making the distributed DNN inference failure-
resilient: In order to provide context for deepFogGuard, we
introduce the elements of distributed DNNs and deepFog-
Guard. Inspired by the concept of residual connections in
DNNs [13], we introduce skip hyperconnections in dis-
tributed DNNs, which are the basis of deepFogGuard’s design
to provide resiliency. Residual connections skip one or more
DNN layers, whereas skip hyperconnections skip one or
more physical nodes.
(2) We conduct extensive experiments using two existing data sets
for sensing and vision applications: We construct a model for
measuring the resiliency of inference in distributed DNNs.
Finally, we confirm the ability of deepFogGuard to provide
resiliency for distributed DNNs in edge-cloud networks.
In deepFogGuard, upon failure of a physical node, the information
flow can still be routed through the distributed DNN, thanks to the
skip hyperconnections. Hence, we call the skip hyperconnections
the Guardians of the Deep Fog, since they act as the guard of infor-
mation flow in distributed DNNs over edge-fog-cloud hierarchy.
2 DEFINITIONS
In this section we introduce the definitions required to articulate
deepFogGuard and provide the necessary context.
Partitioning and distributing DNNs. A deep neural network
G can be split according to a partition map u and can be distributed
over a set of physical nodesV . We denote the partition operation by
⊘ and the resulting split DNN by G ⊘u V . The present study does
not address the problem of optimal partitioning of the DNNs (i.e.
finding an optimal partition map u), as it is not the primary focus
of this article. The optimal DNN partitioning is non-trivial and
depends on many factors including available network bandwidth,
type of DNN layers (convolutional vs. fully-connected), and DNN
graph topology [9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 32, 35]. Instead, this article studies
the resiliency of previously-partitioned distributed DNN models
during inference.
Previously partitioned DNN. If u∗ denotes the desired parti-
tion map for a certain use case (with regards to constraints such as
delay, bandwidth, or energy), GV denotes the resulting partitioned
DNN according to u∗. Hence, GV = G ⊘u∗ V .
Physical Nodes vs. DNN Units: To distinguish between phys-
ical nodes in the network and artificial nodes (neurons or units) in
DNNs, we clarify by using units when referring to DNN neurons.
Additionally, we only use the term physical node; however, the con-
cepts in this study are also applicable to virtual nodes, such as VMs
and containers.
Types of Physical Nodes: IoT devices (e.g. sensors, cameras, or
mobile phones) are usually the main sources of data, whereas cloud
servers are central hubs for processing and storage. Cloud servers
are normally part of large data centers. On the other hand, fog nodes
could host services packaged in the form of VMs, containers, or
unikernels, and can be routers, switches, dedicated servers for fog
computing (e.g. cloudlets), set-top boxes, access points, or firewalls.
Similarly, edge nodes are devices attached to the connected things,
such as WiFi access points, first-hop routers and switches, and base
stations [34].
Figure 1 shows the process of splitting a DNN with four fully-
connected layers and distributing it across two physical nodes v1
and v2. The layers l1 and l2 are stored on node v2 and the layers
l3 and l4 are stored on node v1.W(3) is matrix of weights at layer
l3. Note that a special layer l#1 (called expansion layer) is included
below layer l3 in node v1. This layer is for the reception and the
expansion of the vector of data from the other physical nodes
(to be discussed). Since the distributed DNN resides on different
physical nodes, during inference the vector of output values from
one physical node must be transferred (e.g. through a TCP socket)
to another physical node. We call the transfer link (pipe) between
two physical nodes a hyperconnection.
Hyperconnections: Unlike a typical neural network that con-
nects two units and transfers a scalar, a hyperconnection connects
two physical nodes over which the layers of a DNN is distributed
and transfers a vector of scalars.
Simple vs. Skip Hyperconnections: Hyperconnections are
one of two kinds: simple or skip. A hyperconnection is called simple
when it connects a physical node to the physical node that has the
next DNN layer (i.e. “parent” node in the hierarchy), and is called
skip when it skips one or more physical nodes in the hierarchy and
connects a physical node to an “ancestor” node. In Fig. 1, the simple
hyperconnection between v1 and v2 connects the output values of
layer l2 to the input of expansion layer l#1 . The skip hyperconnection
connects the output of a “descendant” physical nodevj (not shown)
to the input of expansion layer l#1 .
The concept of skip hyperconnection is similar to that of residual
connections in DNNs [13]. Residual connections are a special case
of highway connections [13, 27] and are those connections skipping
one or more DNN layers. Similarly, skip hyperconnections skip one
or more physical nodes in a distributed DNN. deepFogGuard makes
use of skip hyperconnections for added resiliency, so that upon
failure of a physical node, the information flow can still be routed
to the cloud for inference. In Section 3 we explain that adding skip
hyperconnections improves resiliency of the distributed DNN.
Remark: Note that the weights that feed the unit output values
of physical node v2 to the hyperconnection (vector w∧2 ) and the
weights that expand the output of the Add operation to the expan-
sion layer of physical nodev1 (vectorw∨1 ) are all set to 1. The value
of these vectors can be chosen arbitrarily because distributed DNNs
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Figure 1: Partitioning a DNN and distributing it across phys-
ical nodes v1 and v2. The DNN is fully connected (not all
weights are shown).
learn to adjust and compensate their weights during training (the
training process will be discussed soon). For simplicity but without
loss of generality, we assume the value of 1 for these vectors.
Hyperconnection Weights: Similar to connection weights in
neural networks, hyperconnections may also have a weight vector;
the elements of the vector that passes through the hyperconnection
are multiplied by this weight. Let vector wi j denote the hypercon-
nection weight that connects physical node vi to physical node vj .
In this study, ∀i, j wi j = 1, that is the weight of all hyperconnec-
tions is chosen to be the vector 1 (a vector with all elements equal
to 1).
Definition 1. Adding hyperconnections’ inputs. The Add
⊕
oper-
ation is an element-wise vector addition that adds the elements of
two or more hyperconnections. When Hi denotes the set of indices
of all physical node that have a hyperconnection to the physical
node vi , the Add operation at node vi computes the vector x(l
#
i ),
the input vector to the expansion layer of node vi , by adding the
data going through the incoming hyperconnections as
x(l #i ) =
∑
j ∈Hi
wjixji , (1)
where xji is the vector passing through the hyperconnection con-
necting the physical node vj to the physical node vi . Since, in this
article, wi j = 1, we will have x(l
#
i ) = ∑j ∈Hi xji .
We represent the vector output of a failed physical node i.e. null
vector, by the symbol Φ. Formally, when a null vector is added to a
non-null vector, the null vector is ignored. That is, xi j
⊕
Φ = xi j .
In the case where all source physical nodes of the incoming hyper-
connections to a physical node fail, we will have Φ
⊕
. . .
⊕
Φ = Φ,
which means the input of the physical node will be the null vec-
tor. Since in this case, applying operations on the null vector is
meaningless, the physical node outputs the null vector Φ. If the
null vector is propagated all the way through the last layer of DNN,
which means the information flow did not make it to the last layer,
random guessing is performed.
Hyperconnection Dimensions: The Add operation requires
that the dimensions of the operands be the same. However, the
dimensions of the hyperconnections are not always the same, as
they connect layers of DNN in different depths.When it is necessary
to change the dimension of the vectors, we perform zero-padding
to match the vector with the largest dimension. The vector with
the largest dimension also decides the dimension (number of units)
of the expansion layer.
Expansion Layer: A special layer called the expansion layer
is added to a physical node for the reception of the input vector
from the Add operation (x(l #i )) and its expansion to the units of
the first layer at the physical node. The output (vector) of the Add
operation must be connected to the corresponding units in the
expansion layer. Hence, each unit in the expansion layer has one
input, the corresponding value in the output vector. The units in
the expansion layer all have identity function as their activation
function, so that they do not change the incoming data. The number
of the units in the expansion layer should be equal to the number
of elements in the output vector of the Add operation, which is
the maximum among the dimensions of the added vectors going
through hyperconnections.
Training Process: Once the elements of the distributed DNN
(hyperconnections and expansion layers) are added, the distributed
DNN must be trained with the new elements. The training process
need not to be distributed, that is, when the DNN is physically
distributed; the training process can be executed in a “simulated”
environment, where the DNN is distributed in a simulation.
3 DEEPFOGGUARD DESIGN
DistributedDNNs cannot be considered intrinsically failure-resilient
without a proper design. Conventionally, we refer to the distributed
DNNs that are not trained for failure resiliency as Vanilla.
deepFogGuard’s goal is to increase the resiliency of the distributed
DNN. We tend towards passive resiliency, the ability to function
in the presence of failure without any re-training or reacting, but
by exploiting the intrinsic resiliency [30]. To accomplish this, we
consider and experiment with a method that augments the training
process with built-in resiliency: adding skip hyperconnections to
the architecture of a distributed DNN. Skip hyperconnections inher-
ently increase the resiliency of the underlying neural architecture.
Resiliency via Skip Hyperconnections: The concept of skip
hyperconnections is similar to residual connections. DNNs with
residual connections are easier to optimize and have been shown
to implicitly deal with the exploding gradient problem, ultimately
providing better performance than standard DNNs [13]. Inspired
by residual connections in DNNs, in deepFogGuard we add skip
hyperconnection between physical nodes to provide additional
pathways for the flow of information through the model, even in
the presence of partial failures. This is to thwart the no-information-
flow situation, in which the information does not make it to the last
layer of the DNN, and random guessing has to be performed.
Figure 2 depicts the architecture of our experiments, discussed in
Section 4. The dashed arrows represent skip hyperconnections be-
tween physical nodes. (The expansion layers are not shown in Fig. 2,
since the layers have the same dimension in each experiment.) In
the architecture on the right in Fig. 2, all seven skip hyperconnec-
tions that skip one physical node are present. Similarly, all the three
skip hyperconnections that skip one physical node are present in
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the distributed DNN on the left in Fig. 2. Generally, it is expected
that more skip hyperconnections improve resiliency, especially in
more extreme failure scenarios. Nevertheless, we found that the de-
termining the number of skip hyperconnections is a non-trivial task
and depends on the learning task, reliability setting, and original
DNN architecture. Determining the right skip hyperconnections
could be done during training. Resource heterogeneity across edge,
fog, and cloud nodes could also be a deciding factor for setting up
the skip hyperconnections.
Implementation Notes: (1) Skip hyperconnection can be im-
plemented via TCP connections. (2) When implementing the Add
operation, one has to ensure that the failure of a physical node does
not result in an interruption, e.g. when a TCP socket exception
is thrown. (3) When a physical node fails, another physical node
should be able to “sense” the failure. Physical nodes are responsible
for checking the hyperconnections’ respective source nodes from
which they are fed. This can be done through a simple keep-alive
mechanism. (4) Inference should be implemented in a synchronized
fashion, that is, if a physical node fails and its output is not present,
the null vector Φ should be used as the data.
4 EXPERIMENTS
We need to construct a metric for measuring the resiliency of dis-
tributed DNNs. In the following subsection, we define a metric
based on average accuracy to model resiliency of distributed DNNs.
4.1 Modeling Resiliency for Distributed DNN
We consider a set of n physical nodes V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn } over
which a DNN is distributed according to the partition map u.
Definition 2. Reliability setting of the physical nodes inV , is an n-
tupleRV = (r1, r2, . . . , rn ) ∈ [0, 1]n , where each element ri , referred
to as reliability probability, is the probability that the physical node
vi ∈ V survives at inference time. ri = (1 − pi ), where pi ∈ [0, 1] is
the probability that the physical node vi ∈ V fails during inference
time.
For the sake of easier terminology and notation, we utilize the
convention in network reliability engineering, and use reliability
over probability of failure. In order to model the reliability of a given
distributed DNN, we need to model the following: (I) the physical
nodes failing simultaneously during the inference time; and (II)
the probability of a given simultaneous failure. To model (I), we
introduce node failure combination, which is the combination of the
physical nodes that fail simultaneously during the inference time.
Definition 3. A node failure combination of the physical nodes
in V , is an n-tuple BV = (b1,b2, . . . ,bn ) ∈ {0, 1}n , in which each
element bi is a binary value indicating whether the physical node
vi ∈ V has failed (0) or not (1).
We now have a model for (I), through BV . Since, at inference
time, a physical node vi ∈ V can either fail or survive and since
|V | = n, there are 2n possible node failure combinations (multiple
physical nodes can fail at the same time).
To model (II), we introduce p(BV |RV ), the probability of occur-
rence of a certain node failure combination BV during inference
time, given a reliability setting RV over physical nodes V . This
probability can be calculated as:
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Figure 2: Distributed DNN architecture in deepFogGuard for:
(a) health activity classification, (b)multi-camera object clas-
sification experiments. The expansion layers are not shown.
(Physical nodenumbers are uniquewithin each experiment)
p(BV |RV ) =
|V |∏
i=1
[
biri + (1 − bi )(1 − ri )
]
. (2)
As a numerical example, assume that a network has four physical
nodes and reliability setting is RV = (0.98, 0.98, 0.95, 0.94). The
probability of the node failure combination where node 4 fails
(BV = (1, 1, 1, 0)) is p(BV |RV ) = 0.98 × 0.98 × 0.95 × 0.06.
Now we have a model for reliability of distributed DNNs. Next,
we need to define a new notation ∅, necessary to model the re-
siliency of a distributed DNN:
Definition 4. Operator ∅. Given a node failure combination BV ,
the notation GV∅BV represents the distributed DNN GV (over
physical nodes V ), in which those units that reside on BV ’s failing
physical nodes are failed.
Average Accuracy as Resiliency Measure: For modeling the
resiliency of distributed DNNs, performance indicators such as
accuracy, precision, or recall may be used. In this article, we use
average accuracy as the measure of resiliency.
The average accuracy of a distributed DNN GV over physical
nodes V against reliability setting RV during inference is
A(GV ,RV ) =
∑
BV
p(BV |RV ) × A(GV∅BV ), (3)
whereA(GV∅BV ) is the accuracy ofGV∅BV during inference, and
p(BV |RV ) is the probability of node failure combination BV given a
reliability setting RV . Equation (3) calculates the weighted average
of accuracy over all possible node failure combinations (weighed
by p(BV |RV )). Now we have a model for measuring resiliency of
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Table 1: Reliability settings for all experiments.
Reliability Setting RV
Experiment Health Camera
(order: [f1, f2, e1]) (order: [f1, f2, f3, f4, e1, e2, e3, e4])
Surviv. Setting
Normal [99%, 98%, 96%] [99.5%, 99%, 98%, 97%, 95%, 95%, 95%, 95%]
Poor [98%, 96%, 92%] [99%, 98%, 94%, 93%, 90%, 90%, 87%, 87%]
Hazardous [90%, 85%, 80%] [90%, 90%, 80%, 80%, 70%, 60%, 70%, 66%]
distributed DNNs. Next, we discus the datasets, the setup, and the
results of our extensive experiment.
4.2 Datasets
Our extensive experiments are conducted using two existing datasets
for the sensing and vision applications, explained as follows.
Health Activity Classification (“Health”): We utilize the mo-
bile health activity sensor dataset (UCIMHealth [3]) as a benchmark
for failure resiliency of a vertically distributed DNN (see Fig. 2a).
The dataset is comprised of readings from various sensors placed
on different body parts of patients. This dataset is an example of an
IoT application for medical purposes. The dataset contains sensor
acceleration data from three different sensors placed at the chest,
left ankle, and right arm. Additionally, the left ankle and right arm
sensor provide body orientation data, and the chest sensors provide
ECG measurements. The dataset is labeled with the 12 activities
a patient is performing at a given time, and the task is to classify
the type of activity (e.g. if the patient is sitting or running). There
are a total of 23 features, where each feature corresponds to a spe-
cific type of data collected from one of the three sensors across
ten human test subjects. For this experiment, the activities that
do not belong to one of the 12 classes are removed, resulting in
a dataset of 343,185 data points. The health activity classification
dataset is approximately uniformly distributed across each class
after preprocessing, and hence we use a standard cross-entropy
loss function for the classification.
Multi-Camera Object Classification (“Camera”): The multi-
view object detection dataset [24] is used as a benchmark for failure
resiliency in DNNs that are distributed both vertically and hori-
zontally (see Fig. 2b). The dataset contains videos of a street from
six different viewpoints, with object bounding boxes for frames
captured from each camera. The bounding boxes are placed around
three classes of objects: pedestrians, cars, and buses. Each camera
is an IoT node, providing a viewpoint to the cloud for inference.
We crop the images to the bounding boxes to obtain (potentially)
six different viewpoints for each object. We then center and resize
each image to 32 × 32 × 3 pixels, keeping the RGB channels. For
views in which a particular object is obscured (and therefore does
not exist in the object bounding box list), we generate an empty
(black) image [29]. A single data instance is then a collection of six
images of an object from the six cameras, and an associated label.
In total, the dataset contains around 1,400 data points. Since the
distribution of the classes is skewed towards the “car” class, we
utilize weighted (i.e. cost-sensitive) cross-entropy loss to incur a
higher penalty for incorrectly predicting any given data point to
be car [12]. Although the dataset contains very few images for the
bus class, we keep it as one of the classes.
For both experiments, we separate each dataset into train, val-
idation, and test with an 80/10/10 split. We use the validation set
to select the best model among different training epochs. We run
the model for many training epochs, select the model with highest
validation accuracy, and report its accuracy on the test set, which
the DNN has never seen.
4.3 Experiment Setup
We implemented our experiments on Google Cloud using Tensor-
Flow and Keras. In order to assess the performance of our proposed
method on different architectures of distributed DNNs, we propose
separate model configurations for each experiment. For the health
activity classification experiment (Fig. 2a), we consider a vertically
distributed DNN that consists of ten hidden layers of width 250. The
DNN layers are partitioned into four physical nodes (an edge node,
two fog nodes, and a cloud node). The edge node contains one layer,
the first fog node two, the second fog node three, and the cloud
node four hidden layers. Conversely, for the multi-camera object
classification experiment (Fig. 2b) we consider a DNN consisting
of 14 layers of width 32 that are distributed both vertically and
horizontally. The hidden layers are partitioned into nine physical
nodes (four edge nodes, four fog nodes, and a cloud node). Images
from the six individual cameras are merged using element-wise
addition. We designed this highly distributed DNN architecture for
the multi-camera object classification experiment, since it repre-
sents a very general architecture, where the DNN is distributed
vertically and horizontally and is also asymmetric.
In our experiments, we only include the skip hyperconnections
that skip one physical node, since, in the edge-fog-cloud hierarchy,
the number of physical nodes over which the DNN is distributed
is not large. Moreover, we experimented with models having skip
hyperconnections that skip more than one physical node, but did
not observe any performance gain.
Each of the aforementioned models is trained via stochastic
gradient descent using the Adam optimizer [16]. Batch sizes of 1024
and 64, and the learning rates of 0.001 and 0.1 are used for the
health activity classification and multi-camera object classification
experiments, respectively.
We propose three different reliability settings outlined in Table 1:
the setting Normal indicates reasonable network survivabilities
while the settings Poor and Hazardous represent reliability settings
(only for the sake of our experiments) when the failures are very
frequent in the network. We also have the reliability setting No
Failure, in which all survivabilities are simply set to 1. The failure
probabilities of fog nodes and edge nodes in both experiments are
described in Table 1. Fog nodes are denoted with fi and edge nodes
with ei . We assume that the cloud node is always available and does
not fail. If IoT nodes fail, the distributed DNNs will have no input,
and random guessing must be performed. Since we are studying
the resiliency of distributed DNNs (and not their input), we did not
consider the failure of IoT nodes.
4.4 Results
Fig. 3 shows the average accuracy of deepFogGuard and Vanilla
for each experiment under different reliability settings over 10
runs (A(GV ,RV )). We can see that deepFogGuard is successful in
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Config Health + dFG Health + Vanilla
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Figure 3: Average accuracy (%) vs. reliability setting
increasing the resiliency of the distributed DNNs, drastically out-
performing Vanilla.
In the health activity classification experiment (Fig. 3a), in the
Hazardous reliability setting, deepFogGuard increases average ac-
curacy by almost 16%, relative to the baseline Vanilla. Similarly, in
the Poor reliability setting, the average accuracy of deepFogGuard
is around 6% higher than that of Vanilla. This difference in accu-
racy decreases when the reliability of the network is higher (e.g. in
Normal or No Failure). Vanilla’s poor performance under physical
node failure is an indication of the inaccessibility of a path for in-
formation flow, hence the occurrence of random guessing for the
classification task.
In the multi-camera object classification experiment, we observe
the same trends as in the health activity classification experiment.
Since the architecture of the DNNs is highly distributed (vertically
and horizontally) in this experiment, even Vanilla can perform well
(above 80%). This is because Vanilla’s distributed DNN architecture
still receives partial data in certain cases of failure. For instance,
there are built-in redundancies among cameras, edge nodes, and
fog nodes 3 and 4. This is not true for Vanilla in the health activity
classification experiment, in which the distributed DNN is only
vertically partitioned. Similar to the health activity classification
experiment, we see the largest improvement in the Hazardous reli-
ability setting, although deepFogGuard outperforms Vanilla across
the board, in both experiments, under various reliability settings.
This concludes the discussion of our experiments. In the next
section, we explain the state of the art in this direction, and we
position our work’s novelty in the literature. Finally, in Section 6, we
discuss the limitations and opportunities to improve deepFogGuard.
5 RELATEDWORK
The related work in this space can be categorized as follows.
a. Distributed training. Training of distributed DNNs has re-
ceived significant attention from both academia and industry. Some
examples include distributed training frameworks from Google
[1], Facebook [22], Microsoft [7], and Uber [26]. Distributed train-
ing of DNNs across edge nodes is studied in [31] (non-resilient)
and [5, 8] (resilient against adversaries). Nevertheless, inference in
distributed DNNs is less explored. Recently, some IoT application
scenarios have emerged that need ongoing and long inference tasks
[9, 14, 18, 20, 28, 29]. In line with this direction, we study inference
of distributed DNNs, but differently, we consider failure resiliency.
b. DNN Partitioning. DNN partitioning frameworks consider
several factors to find the best partition map to split and distribute
a DNN [9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 32, 35]. These frameworks can be used to
provide input (partitioned distributed DNN) to deepFogGuard, from
which resilient distributed DNN for inference is extracted.
c. DNN Fault Tolerance. In the DNN literature, a concept re-
lated to failure is fault, which is when units or weights become
defective (i.e. stuck at a certain value, random bit flip, weight fault,
or short circuit) [30]. Studies on fault tolerance of neural networks
date back to the early 90s and are limited to mathematical models
with simplistic assumptions (e.g. neural networks with one hid-
den layer, unit-only and weight-only faults, or sigmoid-only neural
networks) [4, 19, 23]. However, none of these works consider the
failure of physical nodes that potentially cause the failure of a large
group of DNN units and weights.
d.DNNFailureRobustness andResiliency. Some earlyworks
study the resiliency of non-distributed DNNs against single or multi-
ple unit failures [25, 36]. More recently, the authors of [10] provide
theoretical definitions and bounds for the failure of elements in
non-distributed DNNs. Contrary to previous works, this article
studies resiliency of distributed DNN inference in the presence of
failure of a large group of DNN units.
6 CONCLUSION
We presented deepFogGuard, a method for failure resiliency of dis-
tributed DNN inference. We confirmed through experiments that
skip hyperconnections increase the resiliency of distributed DNNs.
deepFogGuard has a few limitations and opportunities for improve-
ment, which we discuss below.
Limitations: While deepFogGuard improves resiliency by send-
ing the data along redundant paths, it also inevitably consumes
additional bandwidth when there are no failures. Moreover, keeping
multiple TCP connections active and checking the status of other
physical nodes consumes resources.
Future Work: This study opens many related research oppor-
tunities. Firstly, it is interesting to see how deepFogGuard can be
extended to neural networks that have residual connections, or
other types of neural networks, such as convolutional neural net-
works (CNNs) and recurrent neural networks (RNNs). Furthermore,
regularization or methods that implicitly increase robustness, such
as dropout, may improve the resiliency even more. Finally, one
could consider changing the weights of the remaining hypercon-
nections after the failure of the physical nodes to account for the
change in relative input scale of the physical node.
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